

Globalization, Nation-State, and Local Identity

A Study of an Affair between the Movement of Religious Formalization and the Discourse of Local Identity in Kalimantan Selatan

Irfan Noor

Lecture at UIN Antasari Banjarmasin Kalimantan Selatan

KEYWORD

Globalization
Nation-State
Local Identity
Islamic Local Regulation

ABSTRACT

The formalization movement of Islamic sharia which is currently prevalent in Indonesia has succeeded in taking advantage of the development of the discourse of strengthening local identity in the Regional Autonomy era. One of the successes of this movement is the issuance of various local regulations with nuances of Islamic sharia in various regions in Indonesia. One area that currently shows such a trend is South Kalimantan. In this area, the starting point of the development of the discourse of affirming local identity is the negative impact of global culture that synergizes with the totalitarianism of the construct of the nation state. Therefore, when the distinctive character developed by the Islamism movement is a counter-ideology towards various modernism and secularism, this movement is able to intertwine with local identity affirmation discourse which also develops an resistance to the nation-state construct tend to be totalitarianism in the style of the New Order which is also a product of modernism. As a result, various local regulations on Islamic sharia are discriminatory, sectarian, corruptive, and intolerant of the diversity of national culture.

Alamat Korespondensi:

Dardiri

UIN Antasari Banjarmasin Kalimantan Selatan

Jl. A. Yani No.KM. 4,5, Kebun Bunga, Kota Banjarmasin, Kalimantan Selatan 70235

E-mail: irfannoor@uin-antasari.ac.id

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, our life has been characterized by the fast wave of global culture controlled by the climate of capitalism and neo-liberalism; a culture based on economic power. Therefore, recently, it is difficult to do the changes of social, cultural, political and global processes by getting rid of the development of global dynamics. The progress of communication and information technology has been influencing the everyday life of society widely, even making radical changes of social systems (Castells, 2000). The economic and cultural globalization affects the creating of homogeneous culture aiming at making consumption, life style, value, identity, and individual necessity uniform. Now, we likely live in the world which is characterized by Americanization and uniformity. It means that American culture has been spread and exported around the world in line with free trade ideology (Putranto, 2005).

This paradox, for instance, is proposed by Robert W McChesney (Rich Media, Poor Democracy, 2000). He says that the advancement of information and communication technology on the one hand provides the easy access for the people to get information, develop the people's potency, and improve the people's survival but it has become a developed state instrument or the instrument of capitalists to make hegemony and domination to the social, economical, and cultural life of society.

However, as the product of modernity, globalization introduces not only the advancement of science and technology and modern institutions but also the dimension of cultural modernity such as democratic values, pluralism, tolerance, and human rights. This last point, indeed, has become the main point of the meaning of globalization. Globalization also improves the transnational democracy. (Anthoni Giddens, 2000). The need of the equality of human right, prosperity, and a fairer world order has been voiced strongly. Globalization has caused the demands of wider participation and larger empowerment of people. These phenomena are followed by the re-affirmation of community's identities. There is a demand for acknowledging the local culture and proving that there is resistance to domination and global uniformity as well.

And, nowadays, the movement of religious fundamentalism is a part of affirmative and radical identity's articulation. As a result, the rise of religious fundamentalism is not only due to textual and scripturalistic understanding to religious doctrines *an sich*, but also because of people's radical response to the dominant and exploitative global development by using religion as a legal basis. Prof Bassam Tibi (1998), a Muslim Intellectual living in Germany, points out that Islamic fundamentalism is a part of the Muslim struggle to the domination of western civilization represented by nation-states' disability in solving the problems of economy, culture, and social-politics. "Islamic solution", for some Muslims, is an anti-thesis of immoral and destructive character of Western civilization.

In this rapid situation, people tend to organize groups based on their main identities such as religion, ethnic, region, and state. In this kind of situation, the search of identity, both collective and individual, has become the fundamental source of meaning. As a result, there is a conflict between abstract and universal instruments and particular identity rooting in a local history. Manuel Castells (2000) says "Our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the self.". It is not strange that there are some defensive reactions to globalization, such as in the form of religious fundamentalism, the rise of ethnic issues, the struggle of minority rights enforcement, and racist conflicts.

By explaining the above description, this paper aims at analyzing critically how the rise of *syariah* formalization in Indonesia is able to be an agent of re-determination of local identity through the renewal of ethnic discourse. Religion, as Manuel Castells' opinion, is a fundamental and powerful source for the search of identity. This is because, during historical period characterized by de-structure of organization and de-legalization of an institution, the disappearance of great social movements, and temporary cultural expressions, religious and ethnic identities will be the fundamental sources of meaning. People refer to and base their life on what they are or what they believe, not on what they do.

The Politics of the Formalization of *Syari'ah* From the State to the Confirmation of Local Identity

The fall of Soeharto on 21 May 1998 opened the political freedom in Indonesia. This can be seen from the rise of some political parties. Furthermore, from 148 political parties, there are 42 categorized as Islamic political parties (Salim, 1999).

Together with the fall of of New Order, according to Jamhari (2004), there has been a discourse and movement of *Syariah* formalization in some regions in Indonesia. This trend can be identified by three fundamental cases, namely (1) the rise of national debate on Jakarta charter issue during the MPR session in 1999. Some Muslim groups tried to force MPR members to add seven words which had been erased in Indonesian constitution. These words are "dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluknya", (2) the emergence of *Perda* or the local regulations which have *Syari'ah* nuance in some regions in Indonesia; (3) the rise of radical Muslim groups demonstrably such as *Laskar Jihad*, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), and others.

Basically, there were four debates in Indonesian history related to the struggle of adding seven words in Indonesian constitution and the emergence of *Syariah* formalization in the *Perda* or local regulations,. They

were during: (1) the BPUPKI-PPKI session in 1945; (2) the Majelis Konstituante sessions 1956-1959; (3) the MPRS sessions 1966-1968,; and (4) the MPR annual session on 17 - 18 August 2000 the MPR annual session on 1 - 10 August 2002. The *Persatuan Pembangunan* United Development faction (FPP) and the *Bulan Bintang* Crescent Star faction (FBB,) during the meeting of Ad Hoc I committee of *Badan Pekerja MPR* which had a duty to prepare the amendment of UUD 1945, proposed to include the seven additional words of Jakarta Charter in the main body or *Batang Tubuh* of UUD 1945 (*pasal 29*) (Wahid,2002). Because those efforts failed, there is a new scenario to *Syariah* formalization by fighting in regional level through *Peraturan Daerah* (*Perda*) or Local Regulations or other regulations in regional level.

Why should it be called as "Formalization of *Syariah*"? This is because the meaning of *Syariah* movement, which has emerged recently, is not only to support "the implementation of *Syariah* practice" in everyday Muslim life, but this movement tries to formalize *Syariah* in state's body. It means that the final aim of this movement is the change of the state foundation in order to support Indonesia as an "Islamic State" (Wahid,2002).

Started from Bekasi, now *Syariah* regulations have been spreading in more than 22 districts and cities in Indonesia (Tempo, 2006). It is different from Nanggroe Aceh Darusalam (NAD) which *Syariah* was formalised based on the special autonomy laws of Aceh, the implementation of *Syariah* local regulations in 22 districts/cities are excessive in applying *Anti Maksiat* (anti-immorality), *Kewajiban Berjilbab* (the obligation of using veil), or *Fasih baca Alqur'an* (fluency of reading the Qur'an) in their *Peraturan Daerah* (Local Regulation). These regions are Banten province, Riau province, Gorontalo province, Sumatera Barat province, Makasar, Ternate, Palembang, Banjar (Martapura) district, Serang district, Tasikmalaya district, Sukabumi district, Cianjur district, and Garut district (Wahid, 2000). Even, the last four districts demonstrably declared 'the implementation of *Syariah*' on 1 *Muharram* 2001 (Wahid,2000).

In Kalimantan Selatan, the phenomenon of *syari'ah* formalization can be seen in Banjar, Martapura. It is an effort to increase the image and identity of Martapura (Daud: 1997; Rosyadi: 2004; Rudy Arifin: 2004; Alfisyah: 2005) as the centre of Islamic dissemination in Kalimantan Selatan. Therefore, its government and DPRD in 2001 issued *Perda Puasa Ramadhan* (regulation on Ramadhan fasting), *Perda Khatam Qur'an* (regulation on completing the reading of the Qur'an) and *Perda Pengelolaan Zakat* (regulation on the administration of Zakat) in 2004, and *Perda Jum'at Khusus* (regulation on the devoutness of Friday prayer) No. 08. 2005. Because of these local regulations, some other regions followed the Banjar policy. They are Banjarmasin Amuntai, Hulu Sungai Utara district and other districts in Kalimantan Selatan.

Some scholars (Azra, 2002; Effendi, 2004; Madjid, 2000) say that the emergence of *Syariah* formalization in Indonesian political discourses can be separated from the rise of radical Muslim groups in Indonesia (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004). A little description of these phenomena can be seen from the rise of fundamentalist Muslim groups in the Indonesian public sphere. They are KAMMI, HTI, *Jama'ah Tabligh*, and, to some extent more radical groups; FPI, Laskar Jihad and MMI. Where, indeed, do they come from? In fact, Indonesia is known as a moderate and accommodative country. The answer can be found when the Masyumi activists moved from political arena to Dakwah activity as a result of New Order's policy called as 'depoliticizing Islam'. This process happened when their request to rehabilitate Masyumi was refused by the New Order in 1967. Therefore, since at that time, there was a new paradigm from the ex-Masyumi leaders to enlarge the scope of Muslim struggle in non-political arena. (Yudi Latif, 2005: 497). It was on 26 February 1967, the ex-Masyumi leaders held a meeting in the al-Munawarrah's Mosque (Tanah Abang, Jakarta), deciding to form *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII). Due to the influence of Natsir, DDII got some access to the Middle East countries to get the fund. Moreover, DDII tried to recruit young generations to make organic intellectuals for the movement of Dakwah in university's mosques. This recruitment has been able to support the movement of Dakwah in university's mosques. This can be seen during the 1970s and 1980s in Indonesian prestigious universities such as ITB and UI. The special character developed by these groups is that this movement is not only as the purifying of religious understanding but also as a symbol of counter-ideology to modernism, secularism, capitalism and others which are not suitable with religious values. (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004)

The movement of Islamist groups in Indonesia got its political identity when some Islamic political parties and some Muslim groups emerged due to the political freedom. In this case, the movement of Islamist groups can be categorized into two types: (1) total Islamization by referring to political systems during *Khalifah*.

This type can be represented by *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI); (2) Islamization which still considers Indonesia as nation-state, or to form Indonesian Islamic state. This type is represented by *Laskar Jihad*, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, and other similar groups (Rakhmat and Zada, 2012).

Although the movement of these Islamism are, slightly, different, but these types of Muslim groups have the same perception in the struggle of *Syariah* formalization both in local and national regulations or laws. The fight of *Syariah* formalization can be seen in three kinds (1) the struggle of Jakarta charter; (2) *Syariah* is formalized in national laws; (3) the emergence of *Syariah* local regulations or *Perda Syari'at Islam*.

As a result, the movement of *Syariah* formalization is able to 'cooperate' with the discourse of local identity in this autonomy era. While the ideology of Islamism develops the struggle to the secular ideologies, the discourse of local identity builds the fight to nation-state construction which tends to be totalitarianism as the New Order as the product of modernism. Therefore, generally, the movement of *Syariah* formalisation in the form of *Perda Syariah* is suspected by some scholars. They are suspicious if it uses a reason of local identity to make *Syariah* formalization applicable easily.

***Perda Syari'ah* or *Syariah* Local Regulations in Kalimantan Selatan; A Case of Searching an Uprooted Local Identity**

The phenomena of *Syariah* formalisation in a regional level cooperating with the discourse of local identity can be found in some regions in Indonesia. One of them is *Perda Syariah* in Kalimantan Selatan. There are, at least, three regions which fights actively in making *Perda Syariah*. They are Banjarmasin, Banjar (Martapura) District, Hulu Sungai Utara (Amuntai) district, having a motive to reinforce local identity. In a detailed description, these *Perdas* can be seen as follows:

The City of Banjarmasin:

- *Perda* Ramadhan (Ramadhan Local Regulation) No. 13 in 2003.
- *Perda* Pengelolaan Zakat (Local Regulation of Zakat Administration) No. 31 in 2004.
- *Perda* Ramadhan No. 4 in 2005 (As the substitution of *Perda* Ramadhan No. 13 in 2003)
- *Perda* Miras (Alcohol Local Regulation) No. 6 in 2007
- A circular letter about the using of veil for civil servants in the office of Banjarmasin local government.

The District of Banjar (Martapura):

- A circular letter of the regent No. 065.2/00023/ORG about the using of veil for civil servants in the office of Banjar local government.
- *Perda* Ramadhan (Ramadhan Local Regulation) No. 5 in 2004 (As a substitution of *Perda* Ramadhan No. 10 in 2001)
- *Perda* Pengelolaan Zakat (Local Regulation of Zakat Administration) No. 9 in 2003.
- *Perda* Khatam al-Qur'an (Local Regulation of Completion of reading the Qur'an) for students of primary school, Junior high schools, and senior high schools No. 4 in 2004.
- *Perda* Jum'at Khusus' (Local Regulation of Jum'at Prayer) No. 08 in 2005.

A circular letter about the suggestion of preserving Malay-Arabic letter on the gate of government's offices.

The District of Hulu Sungai Utara (Amuntai)

- *Perda* Miras (Local Regulation of Alcohol) No. 6 in 1999.
- *Perda* Perjudian (Local Regulation of Gambling) No. 7 in 2000
- *Perda* Ramadhan (Ramadhan Local Regulation) No. 32 in 2003.
- *Perda* Zakat, Infaq dan Shadaqah (Local Regulation of Zakat, Infaq, and Shadaqah) No. 19 in 2005.

Generally, the context of the rise of *Perdas* (Local Regulation) was at the same time with the implementation of local autonomy's policy through UU No. 22 in 1999. In line with this policy, many local governments in Indonesia have seen this as their chances to reinforce a local identity which was oppressed during the New Order. Therefore, local autonomy has become an instrument of re-invention of local identity and self-authenticity of a region.

In Kalimantan Selatan, for instance, most of informants who had been interviewed proposed their wishes that local identity can be reinforced or reinvented. For them, this local identity is Islam since the

Banjar has been identical with Islam. Historically, this identity could be found from the establishment of Islamic kingdom of Banjar, the emergence of Sultan Adam's law or UU Sultan Adam reflecting the earlier of *Syariah* formalisation during the Banjar's kingdom, and the figure of Syekh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari who was able to design the Banjar's region as the centre of Islamic studies in Kalimantan. In more specific case, this local identity is proposed in some following phrases; "Banjar itu Islam" (The Banjar is Islam), "Martapura kota serambi Mekkah"(Martapura is the Mecca's veranda), and "Amuntai kota bertakwa"(Amuntai is a religious city).

The need of preserving Islamic identity to be local identity can be seen from the following quotes:

"... karena dulunya Martapura ini disebut sebagai kota Serambi Mekkah, maka kita mengharapkan untuk mengembalikan kembali citranya sebagai kota Serambi Mekkah dengan mencari langkah-langkah, bagaimana agar masyarakat Martapura ini taat kembali dengan agamanya." (Since previously Martapura was called as the Mecca's veranda, we hope that there is a will to reinforce its image as the Mecca's veranda by searching some steps, how to make the Martapura's people to be religious)

Why is social-religious identity important? The answer is because this social-religious identity is closely related to the strong construction of social-religious order in the middle of a rapid social change and the presence of new values from non-Islamic world. An opinion about the importance of keeping the social-religious identity can be seen as follows :

Tujuannya untuk mendukung citra Martapura sebagai kota Serambi Mekkah. Kita kan prihatin karena melihat masyarakatnya religius tapi tindak kriminalitasnya juga tinggi dan ditambah dengan derasnya masuk budaya-budaya asing yang mungkin akan berdampak negatif bagi masyarakat di sini. (The aim is to support the image of Martapura as the Mecca's veranda. We are concerned because its people are religious but there are still many crimes. Moreover, new cultures flow rapidly -into our culture- causing negative effects for the society here)

The search for historical sources of the Banjar shows that Islam became a fundamental social reference for the people's attitude during the Sultanete of Banjar (Ras, 1968). This religious attitude was started when Syekh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari came back from Mecca (Anshari, 2002) in 1772 during the period of Sultan Tamjidillah I. He intensified the improvement of Islamic knowledge in the Banjar (Daud, 1997), and this process got its formal achievement in 1835, or about fifty years after the death of Syekh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari, namely the implementation of *Undang-Undang* or the law of Sultan Adam to the Sultanete of Banjar's people as a basis of social orientation in the Banjar's life.

An assumption can be proposed by looking at a section of the law:

"Adapoen parkara jang pertama akoe soeroehkan sakalian ra'jat'koe laki-laki dan bini-bini baratikat dalal al soenat waldjoemaah dan djangan ada saseorang baratikat dengan atikat ahal a'bidaah maka siapa-siapa jang tadangar orang jang baratikat lain daripada atikat soenat waldjoemaah koesoeroehkan hakim itoe manoebatkan dan mangdjari taikat yang batoel lamoen anggan inja daripada toebat bapadah hakim itu kajah diakoe." (related to the first case, I order to all of my people, both women and men, to follow the ahl wal jama'ah theological thought and don't follow the others. If there is a person following other theological thought, I will ask the judge to bring him/her to the court and give the punishment in order to make him regretful)

From the above sentences, it is clearly found that there is *Syariah* formalisation as the aim of the implementation of the law. Because of this assumption, Alfani Daud (1997) confirms as follows:

Islam telah menjadi ciri masyarakat Banjar sejak berabad-abad yang silam. Islam juga telah menjadi identitas mereka, yang membedakannya dengan kelompok-kelompok Dayak di sekitarnya, yang umumnya masih menganut religi sukunya. Memeluk Islam merupakan kebanggaan tersendiri, setidak-tidaknya dahulu, sehingga berpindah agama di kalangan masyarakat Dayak dikatakan sebagai "babarasih" (membersihkan diri) di samping sebagai "menjadi orang Banjar". (Islam has become the characteristic of the Banjar since centuries ago. Islam also has become the identity of the Banjar making the Banjar different from the Dayak which still follows a tribal religion. Embracing Islam was their pride, at the least in the past time. Therefore, conversing to Islam was a symbol of purification, besides to be the true Banjar)

This fact is clearer when during in the middle of the 17th century the Banjar community was confronted with the arrival of Portuguese who were Catholic and they built a relationship with the Dayak-

Ngaju (Saleh, 1958). In this historical context, of course, it can be seen that a religion is as a marker of identity which was situational consciously attached to a collective of ethnic-group, either by ethnic-group itself or another ethnic-group. In some cases, a person or a group of people who converts to another religion causes not only the change of his/her religious identity but also the change of his/her ethnic-group's identity.

When social degradation has become the fundamental problem in the society, people will see religious identity as their solution. An informant interviewed states that the moral degradation because a society loses its identity protected by itself from negative effects of globalization brought by modernization process done by a state. An illustration described as direct negative effects of globalization is the drug's circulation, porn VCD, sensual media, free sex, and so on. This problem makes some religious figures who were interviewed feel anxious. This is because some Islamic educational institutions and their *Ulamas* have begun losing their role in a society.

In this case, as the ideology of struggle, the movement of *Syariah* formalization is was able to cooperate with the discourse of reinventing local identity during the era of local autonomy. If ideology of Islamism develops the struggle to secular ideologies, the discourse of reinventing local identity will be able to develop an ideology of struggle to the construction of nation-states which tends to be secular a la the New Order as the product of modernism. Unfortunately, when there are negative effects of Globalization in a society, a state plays its role as an apparatus of modernity.

Therefore, when the *governmentless* and *lawless* marked the reformation era, the policy of local autonomy applied in Indonesia has become 'fertile soil' for the growing efforts in developing local identity in this freedom euphoria. This fact can be seen from the research's finding of the Institute Demos Jakarta "*Demokrasi Berbasis HAM di Indonesia; Masalah-masalah dan Pilihan-Pilihan*" (2005:153) done in 32 provinces in Indonesia. It shows that there are only 40% of Indonesian people, after the reformation era, who identify themselves as Indonesian citizens and 50% of Indonesian people who identify themselves as citizens of local society, religion and ethnic group. The need to return to their original identity becomes the context and instrument for the movement of *Syariah* formalization in some regions in Indonesia, Kalimantan Selatan specifically (*Tempo*, 10 October 2004).

The above research's finding is reinforced by the finding of PPIM-UIN Jakarta about *Islam dan Kebangsaan (Islam and Nationalism)* done in March-April 2007. In this research, it is found that the public belief to the religious leaders stronger, about 41%, than that of the state's leaders and political party leaders (MPR and DPR: 11%; President: 22%; and Political Party's leaders: 8%). This phenomenon, according to Jajat Burhanuddin, is due to the weakness of state's capacity in running its government's function. Therefore, a society tends to refer to traditional institutions. The weakness of the public trust to the state capacity will influence the solidarity of nationalism. As a result, the ideology of non-nationalism will be consolidated. In this research, there is a significant finding in which 29,3% of Indonesian people consider their religions and 17,6% of them consider their ethnic groups and local identity as their basis for formulating their personal and collective identity.

The Formalisation of Syari'ah; Between the Reinforcement of Identity and Politized Religion

Although the research finds a significant support from public community to the formalisation of *Syariah* as an instrument of reinventing local identity, but the implementation of formalisation of *Syariah*, interestingly, is supported by political elites. This can be seen from three regions (Banjarmasin, Banjar district, and Hulu Sungai Utara district) in which the the formalisation of *Syari'ah* is implemented through political channel in line with the significant votes gotten by Islamic political parties (such as PPP, PBR, PKS, PBB) di Pemilu 1999 dan 2004. Dengan adanya perolehan suara ini, dimungkinkan tampilnya tokoh-tokoh Islam yang pro-Syari'at Islam berbasis politik.


The aspiration about the formalisation of *Syariah* in political track in the form of *Perda* in the level of politic and bureaucracy, in this research's finding, is understood in a very different perspective from the perspective of public community. From the perspective of public community, the formalisation of *Syariah* means that Islamic values are applied in the real practice. However, from the perspective of political elites, the formalisation of *Syariah* becomes their political instrument and bureaucracy interest. There are two indications recorded from the deep interview with some politicians and bureaucrats, namely (1) the *Syari'ah* becomes the

instrument in increasing the image and trust of Pemda (local government) and DPRD (the regional representatives); (2) the *Syari'ah* becomes political investment of bupati/walikota (the regents), and political parties in facing PILKADA (local election) 2005.


Why does the analysis head to these two indications? The reason is the finding in the fieldwork (Banjarmasin, Banjar district, and Hulu Sungai Utara district) shows that all *Perda* issued in these regions were an initiation of the local officials and local representatives or *Pemda* and DPRD. As an example, *Perda Syari'ah* or local regulation of *Syariah* was an initiation of the Banjar regent. The success of this ex-regent in issuing some local regulations of *Syariah* was proposed again in his vision and missions as the candidate of governor for PILKADA (local election) 2005. In Hulu Sungai Utara district, local regulations of *Syariah* or *Perda Syari'ah* was proposed by the regent in improving his image which had decreased due to critique from some *Ulamas* for his policy in developing Hulu Sungai Utara district.

The operational modus run by the regent, usually, is by inviting some certain *Ulamas* or the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI). Even, in Banjar and Hulu Sungai Utara districts, the regent uses the certain *Ulamas* as his legal basis. Then, the Bupati or regent (a case of Banjar and Hulu Sungai Utara district) invited Islamic organizations, particularly the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and mayor (walikota) of Banjarmasin invited some Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, etc. The result of this meeting was delivered to a certain NGO and political factions in the DPRD. These factions, then, proposed a related commission to consult with the regent or mayor (Bupati/walikota). The NGO was functioned to socialize the idea to the society. Usually, those who make a concept of the initiation of the regent/mayor to be *Raperda* or local government meeting are *Kabag Hukum Pemda* or the head of law section and *Depag* or religious affairs department in each region. In this case, *ulama*, society's figures, and Islamic organizations were put as a legal basis for operational modus of political elites.

A Model of Exploitation of *Syariah* Discourse in Banjarmasin City



A Model of Exploitation of *Syariah* Discourse in Banjar and Hulu Sungai Utara District



In this context, it is interesting to see how the tricks of the *kabag Hukum Pemda* (the head of law section in local government) issued the *Perda Syari'at Islam* (local regulations of Syariah) in which based on *Hukum Tata Negara* (governmental law), a religion in UU Otonomi Daerah (local autonomy law) (section 22 & 32) is under the authority of *Pemerintahan Pusat* (central government). The FGD held in three regions (Banjarmasin, Martapura, and Amuntai) revealed that the trick was the change of *Syariah* discourse to a product of law which was oriented to technical regulations of public order rather than the substance of *Syariah* itself. Therefore, what becomes the points of the *Perda Syari'at Islam* is oriented to the regulation of social order on religious duties of Muslims *an sich*, not related to the regulation of obligation to practice Islamic values which is the substance of *Syariah*. Therefore, the *Perda Syari'at Islam* such as *Miras* (alcohol), *Perjudian* (gambling), *Ramadhan*, *Jum'at Khusu'* (devoted Jumat prayer) and *zakat* was probable to be subordinated into UU *Otonomi Daerah* (Local Autonomy Law) No. 32 at the section 22 and 137 about the authority of regulation social order in region. The *Perda Syari'at Islam* (local regulation of Syariah) about the completion of reading the Qur'an, for instance, can be decided as a local subject in SD (basic school), SMP (junior high school), and SMA (senior high school) through coordination with local education office or *Dinas Pendidikan kota/kabupaten*. This strategy appeared significantly in FGD when it was reminded the accident of deleting the *Perda Miras* (local regulation of alcohol) by Minister of interior in 2002. As an illustrative example:

- *Perda* (local regulation) *Ramadhan* No. 05 in 2004 implemented in Martapura regulates "*membuka restoran, warung, rombongan, dan yang sejenis serta makan, minum dan atau merokok di tempat umum pada bulan Ramadhan*" (open a restaurant or its same types and food, drink and or smoking in public places during the Ramadhan month). Section 2, 3 in Chapter about prohibition and section 4 in chapter about control reflect the point of item (b) about the effort to create a conducive situation and support the practice of fasting and not to confirm the item (a) about the obligation of fasting for Muslims.
- Also, in the *Perda Ramadhan* No. 32 in 2003 applied in Amuntai regulates "*pengecahan dan pelarangan kegiatan yang menodai kesucian bulan Ramadhan*" (the prevention and prohibition of activity dirtying the Ramadhan month). Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 reflect the importance of keeping social order from disturbing activities of religious practices in ramadhan.
- *Perda Miras* No. 6 in 1999 issued in Amuntai regulates "*pelarangan memproduksi, memiliki, mengedarkan, menjual, menyimpan, membawa, mempromiskan, mengkonsumsi minuman keras dan*

minuman memabukkan"(the prohibition of producing, owning, circulating, selling, bringing, saving, promoting and consuming alcohol and its same types). All sections in this *Perda* reflect an effort to keep a social order based on Kepmenperindag (the regulation ministry of trade and industry) No. 359/MPP/Kep/10/1997 about the control and management of production, import, circulation and sale of alcoholic drink. Also in the *Perda Perjudian* (local regulation of gambling) No. 3 in 2000 was issued based on *Peraturan Pemerintah* (governmental regulation) No. 9 in 1981 about the implementation of gambling's control.

- The *Perda Pengelolaan Zakat* (local regulation of Zakat administration) No. 31 in 2004 (Banjarmasin), *Perda Pengelolaan Zakat* No. 9 in 2003 (Martapura), and *Perda Pengelolaan Zakat, Infaq, dan Shadaqah* No. 19 in 2005 (Hulu Sungai Utara) was possible to be issued based on UU No. 38 in 1999 about *Pengelolaan Zakat* (the management of Zakat) and UU No. 17 in 2000 about the third change UU No. 7 in 1983 about *Pajak Penghasilan* (tax of profession). The criteria of *zakat* which were collected were *zakat mal* (property) and *zakat fitrah* (purification). The property which was given as Zakat were gold, bronze, and money; trade and company; agricultural products, garden, and fishing; product of mine; breeding's product; profit; *rikaz*.
- The *Perda Khatam al-Qur'an* (local regulation of completion reading the Qur'an) No. 4 in 2004 regulates about "khatam al-Qur'an for the students of primary and high schools. This *Perda* was possible to be issued based on UU No. 20 in 2003 about Sisdiknas (national education system) supporting the existence of local subject in the schools.
- The *Perda Jum'at Khusus* (local regulation of devoted jumat prayer) No. 08 in 2004 which was issued in Banjar district reflect the regulation of social order from disturbing activities of Jum'at prayer in some mosques located in main streets.

As a result, there are three prominent things in this strategy: (1) These local regulations were issued reflecting the political interest of certain political elites because the points which were regulated in the *Perda* were not suitable with the hope of the society; (2) these local regulations were decided as an instrument for political elites and bureaucrats in order to play an existed religious sentiment without contradicting with the higher state's policy; (3) the products of local regulation can be called as *Perda Syari'at Islam* or local regulation of *Syariah* but it is called as *Perda Ketertiban Umum* (local regulation of public order) *an sich*. Therefore, criticizing the *Perda* does not mean criticizing the religion itself.

Apart from some critiques to the above local regulations, in political development after the PILKADA (local election) 2005, the movement of Formalization of *Syariah* in Kalimantan Selatan will appear significantly in line with the election of Rudy Arifin as the governor in Kalimantan Selatan (2005 - 2010) with 32,36% of the votes. This is because Rudy Arifin often delivers the discourse of the implementation of *syariah* during his campaign for governor's. In its report, **Radar Banjarmasin** on 2 June 2005 writes:

Tampil menjadi calon Gubernur Kalsel 2005-2010 membuat Drs. H. Rudy Arifin MM berobsesi menerapkan sejumlah hal yang sukses dilakoninya kala menjabat Bupati Banjar 2000-2005. Antara lain Peraturan Daerah (Perda) tentang larangan makan-minum dan berjualan di siang hari pada bulan Ramadhan serta Perda tentang wajib khatam Alquran bagi siswa yang lulus sekolah. Itulah dua Perda yang menjadi monumental dalam 5 tahun perjalanan Rudy Arifin memimpin kabupaten Banjar. Betapa tidak, di awal masa jabatannya, Rudy Arifin melakukan gebrakan dengan mengajukan rancangan Perda tentang larangan makan-minum dan berjualan di siang hari selama bulan Ramadhan, kepada DPRD setempat. Polemik pun terjadi. Ada yang pro dan kontra. Kalangan ulama, tokoh masyarakat hingga LSM bereaksi. Ada yang mendukung, ada pula yang menolak dengan alasan materi Perda tersebut bertentangan dengan hak asasi manusia. Namun Rudy Arifin tetap istiqomah. Dia tetap bertahan dengan argumen bahwa apa yang dilakukannya sudah sesuai dengan aspirasi masyarakat dan sekaligus ingin membuktikan bahwa kabupaten Banjar, khususnya Martapura, harus tetap menjadi simbol serambi mekkah. Simbol ini harus dipertahankan sekaligus untuk menunjukkan ciri khas kota yang juga berjudul kota santri ini. Atas persetujuan DPRD Banjar, Perda ini disahkan dan langsung diterapkan. Inilah untuk pertama kalinya, sebuah kabupaten di Kalsel berhasil mengesahkan perda yang berkaitan dengan upaya meningkatkan kekhusuan selama Ramadhan. Berkoordinasi dengan aparat hukum seperti kejaksaan, kepolisian, satuan polisi pamong praja hingga kodim dan


pengadilan., menjadikan Perda ini tidak menjadi macan ompong seperti praduga sebagian kalangan. Perda ini berhasil dijalankan secara efektif. Puluhan orang yang kedapatan merokok di ruang terbuka di siang hari di bulan Ramadhan, langsung ditangkap dan diajukan ke Pengadilan Negeri Martapura. Ancaman hukuman kurungan dan denda menanti mereka. Tidak sedikit pula yang ditangkap karena berjualan di siang hari Ramadhan sebelum sore hari. Keberhasilan Rudy Arifin membuat dan menerapkan perda ini tak pelak mendapat acungan jempol semua pihak. Maka, beberapa kabupaten lain pun meniru upaya Pemkab Banjar. Selain membuat Perda serupa, pemerintah kabupaten/kota ada yang membuat semacam surat edaran atau instruksi yang isinya kurang lebih sama dengan materi perda tersebut. Intinya, mereka ingin membuat kekhususan di tengah bulan suci Ramadhan. Berhasil dengan Perda tersebut, menjelang akhir masa jabatannya, Rudy Arifin kembali melakukan terobosan. Dia mengajukan rancangan perda tentang khatam Alquran. Tanpa bertele-tele, DPRD Banjar mengesahkan perda tersebut. and mission as a candidate of Governor of Kalimantan Selatan Isinya antara lain, bagi siswa yang akan menyelesaikan pendidikannya, wajib khatam membaca Alquran. Selain tamat membaca Alquran, bagi siswa yang akan lulus SD juga ditambah hafal 12 surah pendek, bagi lulusan SLTP wajib hafal 22 surah pendek, dan lulusan SLTA wajib hafal Juz Amma. Keinginan Rudy Arifin menerapkan kedua perda tersebut tidak lain untuk memperkuat nuansa keagamaan dalam kehidupan keseharian di kabupaten Banjar. Karena itu, sangat relevan jika akhirnya kini dia berobsesi menjadikan peraturan tersebut sebagai perda di tingkat provinsi Kalsel. Maka, dalam visi-misi sebagai Calon Gubernur Kalsel 2005-2010, sejumlah hal tentang perda tersebut telah dicantumkan.

(To be a candidate of Governor of Kalimantan Selatan motivated him to have an obsession to apply some successful programs implemented during his duty as the Banjar regent 2000-2005. It can be seen from the *Perda* about the prohibition of eating and drinking, and selling at noon in Ramadhan month and the *Perda* about the completion of reading the Qur'an for the students of primary and high schools. These two *Perdas* were the monumental programs for his duty as the Banjar regent in five years. Surprisingly, in his early duty, Rudy Arifin proposed a plan of *Perda* about the prohibition of eating-drinking and selling at noon in ramadhan month to the Local Representatives. The polemic happened. There were pros and cons. Some *Ulamas*, the public figures, and NGO reacted. Some of them supported but the others did not support since these *Perdas* contradicted with the human rights. However, Rudy Arifin was consistent. He was still holding his idea with the argument what he did was in line with the people's aspiration and as the prove that the Banjar district had to remain as the symbol of Mecca's veranda. This symbol should be kept in order to show its characteristic which is called as 'the city of Islamic students'. With the agreement of the Local Representatives, this local regulation was legalized and implemented directly. It was the first time for the district in Kalimantan Selatan which succeeded in legalizing local regulation about improving the devoutness of Muslims during the Ramadhan month. Coordinating with the law agencies such as the police, the attorney, a group of civil polices, local army, and the court was a way of making this *Perda* successful unlike the assumption of some people. This *Perda* was effective. Tens of people found who had smoked in public areas at noon of Ramadhan were arrested and sent to the court of Martapura. They were threatened with imprisonment and a fine. Some of them were arrested when they were selling for a living at noon in Ramadhan. The success of Rusy Arifin in proposing and applying this local regulation was appreciated by some people. Therefore, some districts imitated the effort of the Banjar district. Apart from issuing the same local regulation, some local governments issued a circular or an instruction letter ordering the similar points as such local regulation. The main point was that they wanted to create the devoutness in practicing religious order during the Ramadhan month. Succeeding in implementing this local regulation, during his last days of being the regent, Rudy Arifin made a surprised decision. He proposed the plan of local regulation of completion reading the *Qur'an*. Directly, the local representatives legalized this local regulation. Some points in this local regulation are; for the students who will graduate their primary school, they should complete reading the *Qur'an*; Besides the completion of reading the *Qur'an*, they have to memorize 22 short verses, for those who will graduate their senior high school have to memorize Juz Amma (the last section in the *Qur'an*). The ambition of Rudy Arifin in implementing these two local regulations was to strengthen religious nuance in everyday life of the Banjar district. Therefore, it was very relevant when, finally, now he has an obsession to make such local regulations in a provincial level. So, in his vission 2005-2010, some points in such local regulations were mentioned.

As a result, it is very possible that the map of the formalization of *Syariah* will experience a wider escalation process in Kalimantan Selatan. If, for the time being, the movement of the such discourse only was reinforced in the level of district/city, it would , after the local election 2005, get its axis in the provincial level, namely through his candidacy as Governor of Kalimantan Selatan.

This assumption will not be wrong if one sees the result of Murenbang (meeting of the blueprint of development) Kalimantan Selatan province, namely *Rancangan Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah (RKPD) Kalimantan Selatan Tahun 2007*. In this blueprint, it is mentioned that a priority of development in improving the quality of human resources is by issuing local regulations of Ramadhan and completion of reading the Qur'an for the students of primary school, junior high school, and senior high school. Later, there was a circular letter from the Governor about the obligation of using veil for females being civil servants in local governmental offices of Kalimantan Selatan.

The scheme of power of the discourse of the implementation of *Syariah*, after local election (PILKADA) 2005, can be seen as follows:



The series of the above scheme can not be separated from the appearance or election of new mayors and regents who tend to support the discourse of the implementation of *Syariah*. As an example is a new elected mayor and vice mayor of Banjarmasin city, H. Yudhi Wahyuni, SE and Drs. Alwi Shahlan, M.Si. These two figures are candidates supported by the PAN and PKS which their roles in Kalimantan Selatan are very active in voicing the discourse of the implementation of *Syariah*. After being elected, they order the obligation of using veil for females being civil servants in local governmental offices of Banjarmasin. Another example can be seen from an elected new regent and vice regent of Banjar district, Ir. Gusti Khairul Shaleh and KH. Khatim Salman. These two figures are cadres of the PPP and PKB which have voiced the discourse of the implementation of *Syariah*. As a result, there is a new force to support the discourse of then implementation of *Syariah* in Kalimantan Selatan.

The Elitism of Local Regulation of *Syariah* and the Loss of Its Tendency to Common People

Because these local regulations were proposed by bureacrats and political factions in the DPRD (local Representatives), these local regulations are elitist and corrupt. It means that the participation of the society tends to be extremely minimal and tends to distort the real aspiration of the society. For the bureacrats and the political factions of the DPRD, found in this research, the aspiration of the society is related to the representation of scociety's elements. It is understood as representation or mass-mobilization to get the support. This can be confirmed because participation should be understood as the a wider involvement of society from

the beginning to the end of the process in which the policy is decided by putting the society as the subject of public policy. Moreover, the composition of such local regulations is impressed as if it just takes other local regulations. It is not academic texts which become the background of these local regulations instead of comparative studies by visiting some regions such as Aceh, Bulu Kumba, Ciamis, and others. In a deep interview, at least, each member of local representatives got Rp 1 million until Rp 5 millions in every visit. Usually, the local representatives invited, at least, 15 local government officials in every visit to a certain region.

Because these local regulations tend to be elitist and corrupt, they are often resisted by the society. As a result, if there is not resistance in the level of society, these local regulations will be blunt in the practical level. For some small sellers local regulation of Ramadhan does not take side with them. For some, it is permitted to have this local regulation if the local government will be responsible for their economical loss due to the close of their restaurant at noon during the Ramadhan month. This local regulation also has a trouble when a traveller passing by in Amuntai, which is known as a transit for travellers, is gotten punishment. In fact, some travellers complain "agama saja tidak melarang orang makan-minum di perjalanan selama bulan Ramadhan, kok tiba-tiba Perda yang buatan manusia bisa-bisanya melarang" (Religion does not prohibit for the travellers to eat and drink in their visit as the exception during the Ramadhan month. But, suddenly, there is a regulation made by human beings contradicts with the religion) Also, in Banjarmasin, local regulation of Ramadhan extremely contradicts with the real condition of its society which is known as a plural society. Even, there is strong impression from the society that the implementation of *Syariah* is reinforced only during the Ramadhan month. For some informants, a critique for this fact shows that local government does not work hard in implementing *Syariah*. Local government tend to use *Syariah* as its political commodity. The scheme of formalisation of *syariah's* problems can be seen as follows :

Kinds of Local Regulation	The Crucial Points	The Effects	The Category of the Problems
Local Regulation of Ramadhan (Perda Ramadhan)	The Prohibition of doing activities during the Ramadhan month; open cafes, restaurants, or eat and drink or smoke in the public places.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease or close the places or activities of earning money for living. • Discriminate the porters who are not able to do fasting due to their heavy work. • Tend to avoid the religious dispensation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The violation of human rights in religious beliefs. • Contradict with the real social-economical condition. • Anti-Pluralism.
Perda Miras (local regulation of alcohol)	The prohibition of producing, owning, circulating, selling, keeping, bringing, promoting, consuming, drinking alcohol and its same types.	Does not work well	-
Perda Perjudian (Local Regulation of Gambling)	The prevention and eradication of the gambling	Does not work well. So that the positive effect of this regulation does not appear.	-
Perda Zakat (Local Regulation of Zakat)	The management and distribution of zakat as the development of economical potency of Muslim society	Does not work well. So that the positive effect of this regulation does not appear.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ineffectiveness of transparent and accountable mechanism in the management and distribution of zakat. • There is no a professional model in managing zakat.
Perda Khatam Qur'an (Local Regulation of Completion Reading the Qur'an)	The obligation of completion reading the Qur'an for the students of SD, SMP, and SMA with <i>tajwid</i> (rules of reading the Qur'an)	• Becomes an additional burden for the students to graduate.	• Tend to avoid a pluralism of the students.
A Circular letter of using veil	The obligation of using veil as the completion of female's	• Negate the neutrality of bureaucrats in religious	• Tend to negate the plurality and religious

	civil servant uniform.	sentiment. • Negate the pluralism of religious beliefs of civil servants.	pluralism of government agencies
Perda Jum'at Khusu' (Local Regulation of Devoted Friday Prayer)	To stop the trip of all transportations passing by the mosques during the Friday prayer from the first athan to the end of Friday prayer.	• Disturb the transportations causing the traffic jams and disturb people's trip.	• Disturb the transportation and traffic.

By looking at the above matrix, it can be seen that there are some people who got and will get the risk due to these local regulations:

Kinds of Local Regulation	Kinds of Sanction	Victims
Perda Ramadhan (Local Regulation of Ramadhan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A fine in the form of money • The takings or destruction of places to earn money for living 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women who do not do fasting due to religious dispensation • Unskilled workers, laborers, porters, and dock workers. • The owners of small restaurants who have a small profit. • Non-Muslims who are not obliged to do fasting. • Travelers who pass by to the region in which the <i>Perda</i> implemented.
Perda Khatam Qur'an (local Regulation of Completion the Qur'an)	• Administrative Sanction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-Muslim students. • Additional burden before taking the final test.
Surat Edaran Pemakaian Jilbab (A circular letter of Using Veil)	• Administrative Sanction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Muslim women who are civil servants(it was found that there were three Muslim women avoiding the circular letter) • Non-Muslim women who are civil servants
Jum'at Khusu' (Devoted Friday Prayer)	• Sanction of sending to the jail for three months or a fine Rp. 25.000.000,-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travelers who pass by the mosques • Traffic jams in main streets.

By looking at the above indications, those negative effects, probably, are due to the implementation of the above elitist and corrupt local regulations. As a result, the implementation of *Syariah* in the form of local regulations, basically, is problematic. This can be seen from local regulation of devoted Friday prayer or *Friday Khusu'*. Although the point in this regulation states that the drivers are obliged to stop since the first athan but the *Sat. Pol. PP kabupaten Banjar* or civil polices of Banjar just are able to slow their driving.

CONCLUSION

By looking at this fact, it is clear that re-invention of local identity made based on ideology of communalism as it is brought by Islamist groups will produce a sectarian, discriminative, and intolerant identity. Furthermore, if this identity is reinforced through political channel, the group who will get the benefit is not a group of society but a group of politicians who will get the political authority more easily. As a result, this identity is not only discriminative, intolerant and sectarian, but also elitist and corrupt.

Therefore, there should be a non-political attempt or a cultural attempt at anticipating negative effects of the globalization. The power of global culture influencing the process of moral degradation in a society must be balanced by the reinforcement of an independent civil society. The definition of the society's autonomy is not only free from the state's intervention, but also free from the domination of cultural and economical global system which is exploitative and capitalist.

The development of civil society is oriented to the formation of plural and democratic society in which a society exchanges its norms and basic values in a consensus based on the pluralism and equality.

It is important for a civil society to develop its power itself in order to anticipate the cultural fragmentation due to the globalization. This will improve the solidarity among groups of the society to maintain the creative social attempts, cultural character, and economic independence. Social rights, finally, as quoted David Held's statement in *Democracy and The Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (1995), is the autonomy of society which can be maintained through two ways. Firstly, the acknowledgment of human rights is enlarged including social, economic, and cultural rights. Secondly, there is an involvement of society in deciding the policy which is not limited in institutions of government but also other institutions and economic and social processes as well. This indicates that the phenomenon of the formalization of *Syariah* is an expression of reinforcement of local identity. Moreover, it is an indication that democracy should be understood and applied certainly in every level of life.

On the other hand, local identity, indeed, appears from a society which tends to view a culture as static, final and closed thing. Therefore, this view should be deleted. This is because, as Bhikhu Parekh's critique (1999), there are two cases related to the pattern of human's relationship with culture must be viewed to be dynamic. *Firstly*, human beings are *culturally embedded*. It means that they live and grow in a world which is structured culturally. Also, they build a social relation based on the framework of system of meaning culturally embedded. However, according to Parekh, it does not mean that human beings are fully determined by their culture or they are not able to evaluate critically about their values and system of meaning. It means that they are deeply created by it and able to solve a part of its influence, not all, and consciously view a world from a culture. *Secondly*, each culture, basically, is plural and reflects a continues discussion between traditions and combination of different opinions. This does not mean that it doesn't have coherence and identity but its identity is plural, dynamic, and open. Cultures grow from their interaction, consciously or unconsciously, with others. Therefore, each culture brings some parts of other cultures and is not really *sui generis*.

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